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TAXATION
CHARLES H. RANDALL, JR.*
Estate Taxes-Apportionment Between Probate, Estate and
Inter Vivos Trust
In Myers v. Sinkler,1 testatrix died in 1957 leaving a will
executed in 1954. In 1936 by deed of trust she had irrevocably
conveyed certain real property in Charleston, retaining the
net income to herself during her life, with life estates to her
sisters after her death, and remainders to children of her
sisters. This trust property was includible in her gross estate
for Federal estate tax computation. 2 Her will provided in
Item II that taxes "imposed against my estate... shall be
paid out of my residuary estate as an expense of administra-
tion, in order that all legacies and bequests made by my Will
shall be free from the same." Item VII of the will referred
to the trust, stating that the testatrix had spent $2,000 im-
proving the realty, and that this amount should be collected
from the residuary beneficiaries of the trust, and should fall
into the residue of the will. Item VIII left the residue of the
estate in trust, net income in equal shares to her sisters, and
on the death of the survivor of her sisters, the corpus to go
to named beneficiaries. 3 The executor under the will brought
this action against the trustee and beneficiaries of the trust,
asking a declaratory judgment that the trust property bear
its proportionate part of the Federal Estate Tax and the State
Inheritance Tax.
4
The trial judge ruled that the taxes must be apportioned
between the trust property and the probate property.5 This
was affirmed in an incisive opinion by Mr. Justice Legge. The
question of the ultimate burden of death taxes, state and
*Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 235 S. C. 162, 110 S. E. 2d 241 (1959).
2. Under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2036 as a reserved life estate. The
section applies to all transfers made on or after March 4, 1931.
3. The provisions of the will are set out at 235 S. C. at 166, 110 S. E.
2d at 24.
4. The life interests under the inter vivos trust and the probate trust,
after the death of the testatrix, were the same; there was substantial simi-
larity in the remainder interests as well, but some differences existed in
the identity and shares of the remaindermen.
5. The excellent opinion of Judge Bussey, below, is printed in the Tran-
script of Record, at 14-30.
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federal, is largely a matter of state law.6 First looking to the
will, the Court found no clearly expressed intent either to
require or to deny apportionment. Item II was held to be
concerned with the probate, not the non-probate estate. As to
Item VII, the Court rejected the argument "expressio unius,"
pointing out that the language might indicate equally the de-
.sire that each of the two estates pay its own way. Thus there
-was found no clear intention in either the trust deed or the
-will. No South Carolina statute covered the question, nor
-were there any controlling decisions.7 The Court then posed
'the issues as follows:8
(1) Which is the fairer and more reasonable-that the
ultimate burden of the tax be borne solely by the bene-
ficiaries of the residuary probate estate, or that it be
apportioned ratably between them and the beneficiaries
of the non-probate trust?
(2) May such apportionment be decreed in the absence
of statutory authority?
The Court held for apportionment, "in accord with the
equitable principle that those who have a common interest in
a subject matter should bear in common any burden affecting
it."' 0 Further support was found in the fact that the two
estates were separate entities, and that the testatrix might
well have been inattentive to the fact 0 that these assets, over
which she had no power of disposition, might be included in
her gross estate. As to judicial power in the premises, the
reasoning of the Court is irresistable:11
. . . Judicial application of equitable principles [the
doctrine of equitable apportionment] requires no statu-
tory sanction....
Here there is but one estate contemplated by the federal
estate tax statute-an estate comprising the probate as-
sets and those of the non-probate trust-the tax is levied
upon the whole of that 'taxable estate.' But the probate
estate and the non-probate estate are in reality separate
6. Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U. S. 95 (1942). The few specific provisions
in federal law are found in INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2205-2207.
7. The nearest case in point was the Gaither case, discussed below.
8. 235 S. C. at 170, 110 S. E. 2d at 244.
9. 235 S. C. at 173, 110 S. E. 2d at 246.
10. As well might her lawyer, at the date of this trust. A much greater
awareness of the existence and impact of tax law has come to the bal
since 1936.
11. 235 S. C. at 175, 110 S. E. 2d at 247.
[Vol. 13
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entities; the former was the testator's true estate, of
which he disposed by his will; the latter was not his
property. The artificial concept of the two as a single
taxable estate, while convenient for the purpose of the
tax, does not destroy the separate identity of each estate.
The equitable doctrine is clearly applicable.
The closest authority in this jurisdiction, the Gaither case,12
was distinguished by the Court, in that that case dealt with
apportionment between items of the probate estate, i.e., spe-
cific gifts or the residuary estate, whereas the instant case
deals with apportionment between probate and non-probate
property. The Court found apportionment to be particularly
called for on principles of fairness where as here the non-pro-
bate property was included in the taxable estate by "legislative
fiction."'13 Further basis for distinguishing the Gaither case
might be found in the fact that in Gaither the Court felt com-
pelled to follow prior direct holdings, 4 whereas in the instant
case it was writing on a clean slate.
By this decision the Supreme Court has indicated that it
is sensitive to this very serious problem. The legal result in
this State is that, absent an indication from the relevant
documents, estate taxes will be borne by the residue, as be-
tween residuary property and specific legacies, but will be
apportioned as between probate and inter vivos property
includible in the taxable estate. This is not a completely
satisfactory solution. More symmetry would be achieved were
the legislature to enact an apportionment statute. It must
be kept in mind, however, that the primary burden rests on
the draftsman of the legal documents to think through the
tax impact on the trust and the estate, and to clearly indicate
where the tax burden should rest.
Tax Accounting-Accrual Method-Dealer's Reserves
In Johnson v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n,15 taxpayer sued
to recover additional income taxes paid under protest. Tax-
payer was in the business of selling trailers. Under his
method of operation, if a purchaser did not pay in cash, the
12. Gaither v. United States Trust Co., 230 S. C. 568, 97 S. E. 2d 24
(1957), discussed in SURVEY OF SouTH CARoLINA LAw, 10 S. C. L. Q. 132-
135 (1957).
13. 235 S. C. at 174, 110 S. E. 2d at 246.
14. Warley v. Warley, Bail. Eq. 397 (S. C. 1831); Brown v. James, 3
Strob. Eq. 24 (S. C. 1849); Duncan v. Tobin, Dud. Eq. 161 (S. C. 1838).
15. 235 S. C. 155. 110 S. E. 2d 173 (1959).
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purchaser would execute a note for the unpaid purchase
price of a trailer, plus insurance, interest and any other
charges, and execute a mortgage as security. The taxpayer
usually endorsed these notes to finance companies or banks
(hereinafter called lenders) either with recourse or with a
guaranty of the unpaid balance. As each note was transfer-
red, the lender would remit to the taxpayer the balance due,
less an amount credited to taxpayer's reserve account on the
lender's books, usually five per cent of the unpaid balance
of each note. If a purchaser's contract became due and un-
paid, the lender would charge this reserve account with the
unpaid balance. After all indebtedness was discharged, the
ultimate unpaid balance in the reserve account would be paid
to the taxpayer. Under the agreements with the lenders, tax-
payer could only receive that portion of the reserve credited to
him when the same exceeded a certain prescribed percentage
of the outstanding balance on the total debt of his purchasers.
The question was whether these amounts held by the lend-
ers as reserves were nevertheless includible in the income of
the taxpayer in the year in which the notes were signed by
the purchasers, or whether they were not includible or were
deductible, as taxpayer argued. In his state income tax re-
turns, taxpayer reported as gross income the sums thus held
by the lenders. Taxpayer then deducted these amounts as
ordinary and necessary business expense. The Commission
denied the deductions and assessed the additional income
taxes. Taxpayer took the position that he was on the cash
basis, but the Tax Commission ruled that he was already on
the accrual method of accounting, but if he were not, the
Commission exercised its power under statutory authority'6
to shift him to the accrual method in order to clearly reflect
his income. The Supreme Court sustained this action of the
Commission, so that the principal question in the case con-
cerned the proper accounting of these reserve account items
for an accrual basis taxpayer.
The trial court held for the taxpayer, on the two theories
that either the amounts held in the dealer's reserves of the
lenders were not gross income to the dealer until received in
cash, or that they were deductible as business expense.
Whether the taxpayer was on the cash or the accrual basis
made no difference in the opinion of the trial court. On
16. CODE OF LAws OF SOUTH CAIo'NnA § 65-281 (1952).
[Vol. 13
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appeal, the Supreme Court held as stated above that the tax-
payer was on the accrual method, and that all events had
occurred to fix his rights to the amounts in question, and
therefore such amounts were gross income. No statutory
provision authorizing deduction of such amounts was found,
and hence the Court decided that the Tax Commission must
prevail.
Previously, the same taxpayer had won a federal income
tax decision in the Fourth Circuit involving the identical
question and two identical tax years. 7 Two months before
the instant decision was handed down, however, the Supreme
Court of the United States, in Commissioner v. Hmnson,'
decided the same legal question adversely to the position of
the taxpayer. The Hanson case is the latest in a series of
decisions beginning with Brown v. Helvering'9 in 1934 in
which the Supreme Court has upheld the skeptical attitude
of the Internal Revenue Service toward reserve accounts of
taxpayers.
As Mr. Justice Taylor points out in the instant decision,
the essence of the accrual method of accounting is that it is
concerned with the time when rights and liabilities arise, not
with the time of actual payments. When the right becomes
fixed, the income accrues. The purpose of such a rule is to
permit expenses to be charged against the income generated
by those expenses. "At the time a sale is made and the
transaction completed, all events have occurred to fix the
amount and determine the liability of the parties from whom
it is forthcoming."20 At this moment, a taxpayer on the
accrual method has gross income whether he receives cash,
a note, or an oral promise to pay. The fact that the claim
might prove uncollectible when due does not affect the ac-
crual of the amount as income.
Accountants and legal writers have expressed some dis-
satisfaction with the federal doctrine, on the ground that if
the taxpayer can show that a fairly predictable amount of
the accrued income will, based on past experience, never be
collected, a reserve should be permitted as an offset against
income to mirror this prediction. Only thus can income be
clearly reflected. Despite the Brown case and its offspring,
17. Johnson v. Commissioner, 233 F. 2d 952 (4th Cir. 1956).
18. 360 U. S. 446 (1959).
19. 291 U. S. 193 (1934).
20. 235 S. C. at 160, 110 S. E. 2d at 175.
1961]
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some liberal federal decisions have permitted reserves of this
nature to be set up. Congress itself in 1954 recognized the
legitimacy of this argument when it enacted section 462 of
the Internal Revenue Code of that year to permit such a
deduction.21 This section and its companion section 452 were
repealed when the Internal Revenue Service persuaded the
Congress that the effect would be disastrous to the revenue.
As the Tax Commission's brief stresses in the instant case,
the South Carolina statute does not even have the provision
authorizing a deduction for a reserve for bad debts, as con-
tained in the federal act.2,2 Thus this line of attack was fore-
closed to the taxpayer.
Exemption of State Stamp Taxes on Notes Issued by
Building and Loan Association to Secure Federal Home
Loan Bank "Advances"
In Laurens Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. South Carolina Tax
Comm'n, 23 the association sued to recover documentary stamp
taxes2 4 in the amount of $2,270 paid under protest. The
assessment was on ten promissory notes issued by the asso-
ciation, a Federal Savings and Loan Association,2" to the
Federal Home Loan Bank of Greensboro, North Carolina,"
hereinafter called the "bank". The notes were required by
law27 to be issued by the association in order to obtain funds
from the bank. The bank was one of many established in
various districts throughout the United States. It issued,
21. At the time of repeal, the Senate Finance Committee Report said,
1955-2 Cum. BuL,. 861, "Your committee desires to make its position clear
that it expects to report out legislation dealing with prepaid income and
reserves for estimated expenses at an early date." Congress in 1960 en-
acted the Dealer Reserve Adjustment Act of 1960, P. L. 86-459, which deals
with the specific problem of the Johnson case and Hanson case. No general
legislative solution of the problem of reserves for estimated expenses has
been enacted since the abortion of § 462.
22. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 166(c).
23. 236 S. C. 2, 112 S. E. 2d 716 (1960).
24. CODE oF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA §§ 681, 688 (1952).
25. Created pursuant to the Home Owners Loan Act of 1933, 12 U. S. C.
§ 1461 (1952).
26. Created pursuant to the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, 12
U. S. C. § 1421 (1952).
27. Section 10 of the 1932 Act, supra note 26, provides as follows:
(a) Each Federal Home Loan Bank is authorized to make advances to
its members upon the security of home mortgages, or obligations of the
United States, or obligations fully guaranteed by the United States, sub-
ject to such regulations, restrictions, and limitations as the Board may
prescribe. ...
(c) Such advances shall be made upon the note or obligation of the
member or non-member borrower secured as provided in this section,
bearing such rate of interest as the board may approve or determine....
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pursuant to law, its capital stock to which various eligible
savings and loan associations could subscribe and thereby
become members of the bank. The association became such
a member. The purpose of the bank was to lend funds
secured by their shares or by first mortgages on homes, and
thereby to promote home ownership, particularly among the
lesser income groups, at minimal borrowing cost. Members
and nonmember borrowers, including federal associations
similar to taxpayer herein, are entitled to apply in writing
for "advances" from the bank, such advances to "be made
upon the note or obligation" of the borrower.
28
The position of the taxpayer association in the trial court
was that the assessment of the tax was in direct violation
of a specific exemption given by Congress in the 1932 statute
which created the Federal Home Loan Banks.2 9 Taxpayer
argued that Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan Corp.,30 was a
controlling precedent. The Tax Commission argued that the
tax was specifically permitted by the 1933 statute which
authorized the creation of federal building and loan associa-
28. Ibid.
29. Section 13 of the 1932 Act, supra note 26, 47 Stat. 735, 12 U. S. C.
§ 1433 (1952), as amended, provides:
Any and all notes, debentures, bonds, and other such obligations issued
by any bank, and consolidated Federal Home Loan Bank bonds and de-
bentures, shall be exempt both as to principal and interest from all
taxation (except surtaxes, estate, inheritance, and gift taxes) now or
hereafter imposed by the United States, by any Territory, dependency,
or possession thereof, or by any State, county, municipality, or local
taxing authority. The bank, including its franchise, its capital, reserves,
and surplus, its advances, and its income, shall be exempt from all tax-
ation now or hereafter imposed by the United States, by any Territory,
dependency, or possession thereof, or by any State, county, municipality,
or local taxing authority; except that any real property of the bank shall
be subject to State, Territorial, county, municipal, or local taxation to
the same extent according to its value as other real property is taxed.
The notes, debentures and bonds issued by any bank, with unearned
coupons attached, shall be accepted at par by such bank in payment of
or as a credit against the obligation of any homeowner debtor of such
bank.
30. 308 U. S. 21 (1939). In this case Maryland had imposed a docu-
mentary stamp tax on a mortgage given by a borrower to the Home Own-
ers' Loan Corporation, a now abolished subsidiary of the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board. The tax was imposed when the corporation sought to
record the mortgage. The pertinent statute, section 4(c) of the 1933 Act,
provided that the corporation, including its "loans", was exempt from all
state taxation. The Supreme Court held that the exemption covered the
entire process of lending, including recordation of the mortgage, and the
exemption applied. It was argued that the tax was on the borrower and not
the corporation itself. In answer to this contention, the Supreme Court
said, quoting from Federal Land Bank v. Crosland, 261 U. S. 374, 378-79,
"whoever pays it, it is a tax upon the mortgage and that is what is for-
bidden by the law of the United States." 308 U. S. 21, 31.
7
Randall: Taxation
Published by Scholar Commons, 1961
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
tions.31 Since the tax was neither assessed against nor paid
by the bank, it was argued that neither the exemption in the
1932 statute,32 nor the Pittman case, 3 applied. The trial
judge, Judge Littlejohn, granted judgment on the pleadings
for the Tax Commission, since there was no question of fact
involved. The opinion of Judge Littlejohn gave controlling
weight to the 1933 statute as the latest expression of the
Congress, and distinguished the Pittman case on the ground
indicated. The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed
in an opinion by Mr. Justice Moss, holding that the 1933
statute is "clear, unambiguous and unequivocal in permitting
the imposition of a documentary stamp tax on promissory
notes executed by Federal Savings and Loan Associations
when such is no greater than that imposed by the [State] on
similar local Building and Loan Associations."8 4 The Court
further found that the association was not immune from the
tax as an instrumentality or agency of the United States.35
The association was granted certiorari by the Supreme Court
of the United States, and the United States filed a brief in
support of the position of the association, arguing that the
tax was in violation of the express exemption and impaired
the national policy sought to be furthered by the statutory
scheme.
It is probable that at the time this Survey is published the
Supreme Court will have decided the case. The position main-
31. Section 5 (h) of the 1933 Act, supra note 25, 48 Stat. 133, 12 U. S. C.
§ 1464(h) (1952), provides as follows:
(h) Such associations, including their franchises, capital, reserves, and
surplus, and their loans and income, shall be exempt from all taxation
now or hereafter imposed by the United States (except the taxes im-
posed by sections 1410 and 1600 of Title 26 with respect to wages paid
after December 28, 1939, for employment after such date, and except,
in the case of taxable years beginning after December 31, 1951, income,
war-profits, and excess-profits taxes), and all shares of such associations
shall be exempt both as to their value and the income therefrom from all
taxation (except surtaxes, estate, inheritance and gift taxes) now or
hereafter imposed by the United States; and no State, Territorial, coun-
ty, municipal, or local taxing authority shall impose any tax on such
associations or their franchise, capital, reserves, surplus, loans, or income
greater than that imposed by such authority on other similar local mu-
tual or cooperative thrift and home financing institutions.
32. See note 29 supra.
33. See note 30, supra. It was argued that in Pittman, the tax was
directly on the federal corporation.
34. 236 S. C. at 12, 112 S. E. 2d at 721.
35. This question does not seem to have been raised by the pleadings,
but apparently was argued before the Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Neither brief directly raises the question in the briefs filed in the Supreme
Court of the United States, but the State discusses the federal instrumen-
tality cases as an analogy pointing towards the non-existence of federal
exemption conferred by the statutes.
[Vol. 13
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tained by the association appears to be a strong one. The
1932 statute expressly grants exemption from taxation on
the "advances" of the bank. Clearly, if the statute of the
State sought to tax the bank itself on the advances, the
statute would be a bar. Instead, the association securing the
advances from the bank is taxed on notes required by the
statutory scheme to be executed and delivered as a prerequi-
site to obtaining the advances. The authority of the Pittman
and Crosland 30 opinions must be weakened if the tax is to
be sustained.
Use Tax As Applied to Subcontractor of
Federal Instrumentality
E-G Sheet Metal Works v. Grain7 involved the recurrent
problem of the imposition of a state tax on the activities or
the property of a firm contracting with the federal govern-
ment. The duPont Company, in 1950, entered a contract with
the Atomic Energy Commission, acting as agent of the United
States, under which duPont was to construct and operate the
Savannah River Plant for the production of nuclear ma-
terials. DuPont was to be reimbursed for all its expenses,
and to receive the nominal sum of one dollar for its services.
Title to all materials, equipment and supplies purchased by
duPont for the project was to vest in the United States
whenever title passed from the vendor. DuPont was author-
ized to enter sub-contracts and made such a contract with
E-G, a New Jersey partnership, under which the latter was
to supply materials and labor for sheet metal duct work and
to construct a central fabricating shop on the site. The sub-
contractor purchased a substantial amount of materials which
it incorporated into the project, title to which vested in the
United States. It also purchased some materials, such as
trucks, automobiles and other articles of heavy equipment,
to which title never passed to the Government. It also pur-
chased some materials, such as paper and other small items
which were consumed by it in carrying out its contract. The
Tax Commission collected under protest use taxes on the
latter two categories of property, to which title never passed
to the general Government. Taxpayer E-G brought this ac-
tion to recover these taxes. It argued, first, that the trans-
36. See note 30 supra.
37. 235 S. C. 290, 111 S. E. 2d 562 (1959).
1961]
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actions were protected from state taxatioli by the doctrine
of implied constitutional immunity, and second, that section
9(b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 194638 expressly granted
exemption. Both of these contentions were upheld by the
circuit court, affirming the report of the master.
The Supreme Court reversed in an opinion by Mr. Justice
Oxner. As to the argument based on implied immunity, the
Court found that the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Alabama v. King & Boozer39 and Curry v.
United States40 were controlling. These decisions established
that the test of state power rested upon the legal incidence
of the particular tax, rejecting the previous rationale test-
ing the legitimacy of the tax by asking whether the economic
burden was on the government. The Court rejected the ar-
gument of the taxpayer that the case of Kern-Limerick, Inc.
v. Scurlock4' had overruled the King & Boozer and Curry
decisions. More recent decisions 42 of the Supreme Court of
the United States approving the latter two decisions were
cited.
The Court admitted that the issue of statutory exemption
was a more difficult one. The taxes in question related to
items purchased before October 1, 1953, the effective date
of repeal of the last sentence of section 9(b) of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1946. Hence at the time of purchases of these
items, the sentence was in effect. It read as follows: "The
38. 60 Stat. 765, deleted by Act of Aug. 13, 1953, 67 Stat. 575.
39. 314 U, S. 1 (1941). The taxpayer sold lumber on the order of "cost-
plus-a-fixed-fee" contractors for use by the latter in building an army
camp for the United States. Alabama subjected the transactions to sales
tax under a statute requiring the seller to pay the tax, but collect it from
the purchaser. The Court held that although the burden of the tax would
ultimately be borne by the federal government, the legal incidence was on
the contractors, and the tax was not violative of federal immunity.
40. 314 U. S. 14 (1941). In this case, a companion case to the King &
Boozer decision, the materials subjected to the Alabama sales tax were
used by contractors in performing their cost-plus contract with the govern-
ment. Again, the Court found no exemption.
41. 347 U. S. 110 (1954). Private contractors engaged in construction
of a naval ammunition depot procured from Kern-Limerick two tractors
for use on the project. Arkansas applied its Gross Receipts Tax Law, a
sales tax, to the purchases. The Court held that the government was the
real purchaser, with the contractors merely acting as purchasing agents.
No liability of the purchasing agent to the seller arose from the trans-
action. Finding that the purchaser was the United States, the Court held
that King & Boozer was not controlling, and ruled the transactions exempt
from state sales tax. Justices Black and Douglas and Chief Justice Warren
dissented.
42. U. S. v. City of Detroit, 355 U. S. 466 (1958); U. S. v. Township
of Muskegon, 355 U. S. 484 (1958) ; City of Detroit v. Murray Corporation,
355 U. S. 489 (1958).
10
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Commission, and the property, activities, and income of the
Commission, are hereby expressly exempted from taxation
in any manner or form by any State, county, municipality,
or any subdivision thereof." Hence, the question arose wheth-
er the contract between E-G and duPont and its performance
were "activities of the Commission" within the activities
clause of section 9(b). In Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co.43
the Supreme Court of the United States had held that Roane-
Anderson, as manager of the government-owned town of Oak
Ridge, Tennessee, and Carbide and Carbon Chemicals, as
operator of Oak Ridge plants for the production of fission-
able materials, were engaged in "activities of the Commis-
sion", and thus exempted from Tennessee sales and use taxes.
In General Electric Co. v. Washington,44 the Court on the
authority of the Roane-Anderson case reversed per curiam a
decision of the Supreme Court of Washington which had
sustained a business occupation tax on General Electric, the
manager of the Hanford plant in that state.
The issue was complicated by the fact that the contract
between E-G and duPont contained a provision that "The
prices listed herein do not include any State or local sales or
use taxes, as any work performed or materials purchased as
the result of this subcontract are exempted from such taxes."
However, Justice Oxner pointed out that this contractual pro-
vision as well as section 9(b) itself had apparently always
been construed by the Atomic Energy Commission as apply-
ing only to property physically incorporated into the project,
and to which the Commission acquired title.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina distinguished Roane-
Anderson45 and General Electric46 on the ground that the
contractors in those cases were essentially agencies of the
Atomic Energy Commission, performing essential activities
of the Commission. In the instant case, it was pointed out,
title to the taxed property never passed to duPont or the
Commission, "nor did either ever assume any liability for
payment."47 The Court said:48
... We do not think that Section 9(b) contemplated that
every person, firm or corporation who might do business
43. 342 U. S. 232 (1952).
44. 347 U. S. 909 (1954).
45. 342 U. S. 232 (1952).
46. 347 U. S. 909 (1954).
47. 235 S. C. at 299, 111 S. E. 2d at 567.
48. Id.
1961]
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with duPont or who might have some part, however re-
mote, in the construction of the Savannah River Project
should be exempt from taxation. If respondent is exempt,
are the purchases made by those who did business with it
exempt? Does the exemption extend to all those who sold
merchandise which in some manner was ultimately con-
sumed or used in the construction of the project? Adop-
tion of respondent's construction would lead to a rather
unreasonable result.
Intergovernmental Immunity Doctrine-
Use Tax Applied to Federal Contractor
The extent to which the doctrine of intergovernmental im-
munities protected duPont itself, as agent of the United
States operating the Savannah River plant, from subjection
to sales and use taxes was before a three-judge United States
District Court in United Stated v. Livington.49 The taxes
assessed in this case related to articles purchased at the
Savannah River Project after the effective date of repeal
of the sentence in section 9(b)50 granting exemption from
State and local taxes. The United States and duPont brought
the action against the members of the South Carolina Tax
Commission to enjoin the collection of sales and use taxes
upon the use of purchased materials at the Savannah River
Project. The statutory5 ' three-judge Court, in an opinion by
Judge Haynsworth, after rejecting arguments that it did
not have jurisdiction of the case, or should in its discretion
abstain therefrom,52 held that duPont was the alter ego of
the United States for the purpose of carrying out the con-
tract. The factual background and the terms of the contract,
together with the fact that title to all goods and materials
purchased passed directly from the vendors to the United
States, led the majority to this conclusion. The prayer for
injunction was granted. Judge Timmerman dissented both
on the jurisdictional arguments and on the merits. On appeal,
49. 179 F. Supp. 9 (E. D. S. C. 1959).
50. See note 38 supra.
51. 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2284 (1952).
52. It was argued that jurisdiction was lacking in that, pursuant to 28
U. S. C. § 1341 (1952), a "plain, speedy and efficient remedy" was avail-
able in the state courts. The majority held that since it was at least doubt-
ful whether interest would be paid on any amount paid under protest to
the state, in the event duPont prevailed in a suit for refund, the remedy
at law was inadequate.
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the Supreme Court of the United States summarily affirmed
per curiam.55
As in the E-G Sheet Metal Works case,54 the Court felt
that the central legal question concerned the line drawn by
the Supreme Court between the King & Boozer and Curry
cases 55 on the one hand, and the case of Kern-Limerick, Inc.
v. Scurlock56 on the other. The majority felt that although
the contract with the Atomic Energy Commission did not
in name designate duPont an "agent" of the Commission, it
was in fact a managing agent and its contracts and procure-
ment activities were "authorized, and were openly on behalf
of the United States and at the government's expense and
risk."57 Thus, the contract was analagous to that in Kern-
Limerick, where the taxpayer had been designated by the
contract purchasing agent for the Navy Department in con-
nection with construction of an ammunition depot. Judge
Timmerman concluded that the duPont Company was not an
agent but an independent contractor, and, therefore, the
legal incidence of the taxes did not fall upon the United
States.
The Tax Commission also argued that irrespective of own-
ership, duPont had a separable and beneficial use of the
property for the purpose of carrying out its contract with
the Government, and that the statute reached such use. It
was argued that, while in form the contract purported to
pay duPont only one dollar, in actuality duPont profited both
by procuring on behalf of the Government products from
duPonfts separate commercial organization and by gaining
familiarity and expertise with nuclear science and technology.
The Court held that even assuming any peripheral profits
accruing to duPont from its activities, the use of goods and
materials at the plant was so completely a use by the United
States that the immunity applied.
53. 364 U. S. 281 (1960). Justices Black and Douglas indicated their
opinion that the case should have been put down for full briefing and
argument in the Supreme Court.
54. 235 S. C. 290, 111 S. E. 2d 562 (1959).
55. See notes 39, 40 supra.
56. See note 41 supra.
57. 179 F. Supp. at 22.
19611
13
Randall: Taxation
Published by Scholar Commons, 1961
